Newsletter 2026 – 05

June 3, 2026

1 Rush Hour – June 16, 2026 – 4Wings

On Tuesday, June 16, 2026, Mploy is organizing the next Spitsuur HR together with Salar. From the impact of the coalition agreement and the much-discussed “time clock ruling” to the new wage transparency legislation: our experts translate complex regulations into concrete insights for your organization. You can find more information and register here

2 Office news

Mploy is pleased to welcome Mr. Muzaffer Çalişkan as an associate. He previously gained extensive experience in social law at a representative employee organization and at both national and international law firms. Mr. Çalişkan will focus on employment and social security law in the broadest sense.

An opinion piece by Steven Renette appeared in De Morgen on May 15, 2026, titled “Whoever truly wants to reform the sick note should not seek salvation in checks but in the division of roles itself.” You can read his piece here

3 Case law – agency and the termination of the agreement

Court of Justice 23 April 2026, C-204/25, Kempen Advies Beerse et al.

A commercial agency agreement does not terminate on the date on which the commercial agent becomes aware or could reasonably become aware of the termination of that agreement, but only on the date on which the notice period expires.

Bank Nagelmackers had entered into three commercial agency agreements with Kempen Advies Beerse, Compagnie LLC, and FP Verzekeringen on May 22, 2003, December 22, 2006, and January 31, 2006, respectively. On July 8, 2016, the bank terminated those three agency agreements with notice periods ranging from one to six months, and for two of them against payment of termination compensation. On October 27, 2016, the bank and the three agents reached a comprehensive agreement regarding the termination compensation, the compensation for loss of business, and the additional compensation due to them as a result of the termination of those agency agreements.
Because the agents were of the opinion that the global agreement had been concluded under pressure from the bank, they sought its annulment before the Commercial Court, inter alia on the grounds of the mandatory provisions of Book X of the Belgian Economic Law Code. Their claim was rejected by both that court and the Court of Appeal because, upon notification of the termination, they had regained their contractual freedom, even if the execution of that agreement continued until the end of the notice period. The agents subsequently appealed to the Court of Cassation. It referred a preliminary question to the Court of Justice: “Should the commercial agency agreement be regarded as terminated within the meaning of Article 15(2) and Article 19 of Directive 86/653 at the time of the effective termination of the commercial agency agreement, i.e. after the expiry of the notice period, or at the time when the commercial agent becomes aware or could reasonably have become aware of the termination of the commercial agency agreement?” According to Article 19 of Directive 86/653, parties may not derogate from Articles 17 and 18 to the detriment of the commercial agent before the agreement has been terminated. Those articles govern the agent’s right to compensation for loss of business and to redress for particular damage.
The Court's answer leaves nothing to be desired in terms of clarity: “a commercial agency agreement does not terminate on the date on which the commercial agent becomes aware or can reasonably become aware of the termination of that agreement, but only on the date on which the notice period expires.” The Court considers, inter alia, that the termination of the agency does not put an end to the economic dependence of the agent on the principal and thus to the inequality between the parties.
The ruling of the Court of Justice warrants further study, even for employment law practitioners. According to common opinion, in the event of termination, the employee regains his freedom at the moment of notification of the termination (Cass. 22 May 1978, RW 1978-79, 1435; Cass. 12 October 1998, RW 1998-99, 1351). From the moment of notification of the termination by the employer, the employee may, according to settled case law, enter into all agreements and, in particular, waive the rights due to him, such as the statutory notice period. Would that case law now be called into question in light of the judgment under discussion?

Ludo Vermeulen, Partner lawyer
ludo.vermeulen@mploy.be

4 Case Law – and once again on the Unified Statute Act

Brussels Labour Court, 10 February 2026, www.juportal.be

A worker starts employment on March 22, 1999. In 2018, he is granted the status of an employee. The employer dismisses him on April 22, 2022.

The Court establishes that he de facto remained a manual worker but was conventionally granted white-collar status. The Court subsequently establishes that, in this specific situation, the employee is disadvantaged by the Unified Status Act (and the transitional provisions) compared to the situation without that Act. Indeed, under the Employment Contracts Act prior to the amendments of late 2013, he would have been entitled to a notice period in accordance with the old Article 82, which gave rise to the Claeys formula. According to the Labour Court, in that case he would have been entitled to severance pay of 23 months, whereas he is now entitled to 56 days and 27 weeks (= 35 weeks). The Court refers a preliminary question to the Constitutional Court regarding this 'deterioration' in protection.

One might wonder whether the Labour Court could not have reached a different decision by applying the principle of novation. Was a new agreement not concluded through the transition to the white-collar status? That question is not addressed in the judgment. The consequence of such novation would be that the notice period must be calculated in its entirety in accordance with the rules of Article 37/2 of the Employment Contracts Act, which would result in a notice period of 65 weeks for the employee.